I provide an argument against the Aristotelian view of universals, according to which universals depend for their existence on their exemplifiers. The argument consists in a set of five jointly inconsistent assumptions. As such, the argument can be used to argue in favour of other conclusions, such as that exemplification is no relation or that plausible principles concerning ontological dependence or grounding do not hold.

Transposable elements (TEs) are mobile genomic elements constituting a big fraction of eukaryotic genomes. They ignite an evolutionary arms race with host genomes, which in turn evolve strategies to restrict their activity. Despite being tightly repressed, TEs display precisely regulated expression patterns during specific stages of mammalian development, suggesting potential benefits for the host. Among TEs, the long interspersed nuclear element (LINE‐1 or L1) has been found to be active in neurons. This activity prompted extensive research into its possible role (...) in cognition. So far, no specific cause‐effect relationship between L1 retrotransposition and brain functions has been conclusively identified. Nevertheless, accumulating evidence suggests that interactions between L1 RNAs and RNA/DNA binding proteins encode specific messages that cells utilize to activate or repress entire transcriptional programs. We summarize recent findings highlighting the activity of L1 RNAs at the non‐coding level during early embryonic and brain development. We propose a hypothesis suggesting a mutualistic relationship between L1 mRNAs and the host cell. In this scenario, cells tolerate a certain rate of retrotransposition to leverage the regulatory effects of L1s as non‐coding RNAs on potentiating their mitotic potential. In turn, L1s benefit from the cell's proliferative state to increase their chance to mobilize. (shrink)

The A Simili Argument draws the conclusion that a target case has a normative property Q since it shares a relevant property P with a source case. It can be seen as a complex inference constituted by three inferential steps: An abduction of the relevant property P , an induction of the class having that property, and a deduction of the target's having property Q . A major problem of this argument is the characterization of the property relevance. The standard (...) answer refers to the notion of ratio: It is the ratio that fixes what is relevant for what. But the determination of the ratio is often a difficult and controversial task. This issue is considered here from an inferentialist point of view, claiming that the ratio and relevance are determined by the normative statuses reciprocally attributed by the speakers in the context of legal argumentation. (shrink)

In this article we tackle the core question of machine emotion research – “Can machines have emotions?” – in the context of “social robots”, a new class of machines designed to function as “social partners” for humans. Our aim, however, is not to provide an answer to the question “Can robots have emotions?” Rather we argue that the “robotics of emotion” moves us to reformulate it into a different one – “Can robots affectively coordinate with humans?” Developing a series of (...) arguments relevant to theory of emotion, philosophy of AI, and the epistemology of synthetic models, we argue that the answer to this different question is positive, and that it lays grounds for an innovative ethical approach to emotional robots. This ethical project, which we introduced elsewhere as “synthetic ethics”, rejects the diffused ethical condemnation of emotional robots as “cheating” technology. Synthetic ethics focuses not on an ideological refusal, but on the concrete sustainability of the emerging mixed human-robot social ecologies. On this basis, in contrast to a purely negative ethical approach to social robotics it promotes an analytical case by case ethical inquiry into the type of human flourishing that can result from human-robot affective coordination. (shrink)

I will reflect on the reconciliation between “subjective” life and “objective” doctrine experienced by Catholic lgbt couples. Even though their particular experience cannot be considered as universal it can nevertheless constitute a case study for theological reflection. I will propose a theological model for the integration of lgbt Catholics into Christian communities. The case of lgbt Catholics also helps us address the theoretical difficulties of religious pluralism. Their experience of faith is an example of “lived pluralism”. In the lexicon of (...) religious pluralism, this experience is an intra-system or intra-theistic diversity, but it also touches upon the meta-theological issue of the model of reason that is to be applied to every system. I believe that every possible case of pluralism is worth considering if we want to theorize this concept. This may lead us to consider pluralism as a premise from which to start, articulated at different levels. (shrink)

Indice del capitolo: 1. introduzione; 2. primo sguardo alla bibliografia e punti fermi; 3. la "negazione simbolica" al fondo della strategia anti-gender; 4. il gender come sfida antropologica per la teologia cattolica; 5. teologia del maschile e del femminile, mistero nuziale; 6. unità duale; 7. complementarietà e reciprocità asimmetrica; 8. una caro, fenomenologia dei gesti, integrazione; 9. una teologia inclusiva per un'antropologia adeguata; 10. matrimonio, verginità, relazione pura; 11. note sulla teologia trinitaria della famiglia; 12. antropologia trinitaria; 13. conclusione.

The Aristotelian view of universals, according to which each universal generically depends for its existence on its instantiations, has recently come under attack by a series of ground-theoretic arguments. The last such arguments, presented by Raven, promises to offer several significant improvements over its predecessors, such as avoiding commitment to the transitivity of ground and offering new reasons for the metaphysical priority of universals over their instantiations. In this paper, we argue that Raven's argument does not effectively avoid said commitment (...) and that Raven's new reasons fail. Moreover, we present a novel ground-theoretic interpretation of the Aristotelian view, referred to as strong immanence, and introduce a new argument against the Aristotelian view, intended to sidestep any commitment to the transitivity of ground. (shrink)

"Cover " -- "Title Page " -- "Copyright " -- "Contents " -- "Preface to the English Edition" -- "Introduction" -- "1. The Substitute" -- "2. Animals, Machines, Cyborgs, and the Taxi " -- "3. Mind, Emotions, and Artificial Empathy " -- "4. The Other Otherwise " -- "5. From Moral and Lethal Machines to Synthetic Ethics " -- "Notes" -- "Works Cited" -- "Acknowledgments" -- "Credits.

It is well known that experts’ opinion and testimony take on a decisive weight in judicial fact-finding, raising issues and perplexities that have long been under scholarly scrutiny. In this paper I argue that expert’s opinions have a much wider impact on legal decision-making. In particular, they may generate a problem that I will call ‘the opacity of law’. A legal text, such as a statute or regulation, becomes opaque if a legal authority is not able to grasp its full (...) linguistic content but is nevertheless in a position to use it, thanks to an expert’ opinion, in legal decision-making. When this occurs, not only do experts contribute to fact-finding but also to determining the content of the law. In the paper I analyse the linguistic and cognitive sources of this phenomenon, its characteristics and troublesome consequences, and the different kinds of opacity that may affect legal decision-making. (shrink)

Tomos II. Koinōnikes epistēmes kai epistēmes tou anthrōpou: ho gallikos dromos tēs ennoias.

Sahlqvist theory is extended to the fragments of the intuitionistic propositional calculus that include the conjunction connective. This allows us to introduce a Sahlqvist theory of intuitionistic character amenable to arbitrary protoalgebraic deductive systems. As an application, we obtain a Sahlqvist theorem for the fragments of the intuitionistic propositional calculus that include the implication connective and for the extensions of the intuitionistic linear logic.

The debate on divine omniscience and its compatibility with human freedom, developed after the formulation of the famous Pike’s Argument, has led some authors to formulate a new form of theism called open theism. The main thesis of this theory deals with the redefinition of the attribute of omniscience – meant as dynamic – and other divine attributes, such as eternity and immutability. The core of the theory, however, lies in the assumption, in metaphysical terms, of the affirmation of the (...) New Testament «God is love» (revoking some insights of Trinitarian theology). Clearly, the critiques moved to open theism, in the intense and still underway debate, are various, but the most compelling ones concern the weakness of the new metaphysics that open theism is trying to build. After setting out the main features of the debate around omniscience, the thesis and the main objections to open theism, it appears possible to draw some conclusions which, although temporary, show how the theoretical path defended by open theism represents an appealing challenge for contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. (shrink)

The paper offers some observations with a view to correcting ostensible misunderstandings of the so-called New Natural Law (“NNL”) theory, concluding that the NNL theory is unworkable and unsustainable, even on its own terms. It is argued that the NNL theory is based on fundamental misunderstandings of the nature of necessity in Aquinas; the nature of propositions which are “known in themselves” (per se nota); and the nature of fundamental practical reasoning. It is argued that, where the NNL theory differs (...) from that of Aquinas, the latter provides a better framework for the development of accounts of natural law today. (shrink)

This paper develops an endurantist theory of persistence. The theory is built around one basic tenet, which concerns existence at a time – the relation between an object and the times at which that object is present. According to this tenet, which I call transcendentism, for an object to exist at a time is for it to participate in events that are located at that time. I argue that transcendentism is a semantically grounded and metaphysically fruitful. It is semantically grounded, (...) insofar as a semantic analysis of our temporal talk favors it over rivals. It is metaphysically fruitful, insofar as the theory of persistence that can be built around it – the transcendentist theory of persistence, to give it a name – requires neither temporal parts nor the problematic commitments to which all extant forms of endurantism are committed, such as the possibility of extended simples or multilocation. (shrink)

The possibility of multi-location—of one entity having more than one exact location—is required by several metaphysical theories such as the immanentist theory of universals and three-dimensionalism about persistence. One of the most pressing challenges for multi-location theorists is that of making sense of exact location—in that extant definitions of exact location entail a principle called ‘functionality’, according to which nothing can have more than one exact location. Recently in a number of promising papers, Antony Eagle has proposed and defended a (...) definition of exact location in terms of weak location that does not entail functionality. This paper provides the first thorough assessment of Eagle’s proposal. In particular, we argue that it cannot account for the location of immanent universals, the multi-location of mereologically changing three-dimensional objects, the multi-location of mereologically complex objects, and that it makes extended simples impossible. (shrink)

Interpretation without Truth is the result of thirty years of research that Pierluigi Chiassoni has devoted to legal interpretation and legal reasoning. More generally, the book represents one of t...

Persistence in Time No person ever steps into the same river twice—or so goes the Heraclitean maxim. Obscure as it is, the maxim is often taken to express two ideas. The first is that everything always changes, and nothing remains perfectly similar to how it was just one instant before. The second is that nothing … Continue reading Persistence in Time →.

The essay explores the possibilities afforded by Heidegger’s thought for addressing the question of the reality of the phenomenon within the framework of the theory of quantum mechanics. Heidegger’s conception of the task of phenomenology is seen to provide a crucial axis along which the phenomenon of quantum physics can be connected both to its appearance in language and to the historical unfolding of the horizon that grounds the possibility of an encounter with the phenomenon itself. The determinations of this (...) horizon, i.e. of the order of “phenomenality” that makes the appearance of the phenomenon possible, are analyzed in the instance of quantum mechanics, and compared to the ones presented by Heidegger in his considerations concerning the appearing of the phenomenon in Aristotelian and classical physics. The three main directives that structure the analysis of this order of phenomenality are the determinations of the conditions of experience of the phenomenon, of the function of language that makes this appearance possible, and of the subject function that constitutes, and is in turn constituted by, this experience. (shrink)

Legal scholarship has so far paid little attention to the concept of border, which is one of the reasons for the lack of clarity regarding the characteristics of public borders at the present time. This paper aims to contribute to fill this gap by looking at an apparently eccentric phenomenon regarding the contemporary transformation of state borders: the so-called border walls. At a first sight, border walls seem to reiterate the traditional functions of state borders. But their rising up as (...) physical uncrossable barriers signifies a strong change in their function and institutional nature. In the light of this, a question arises: Does the proliferation of border walls simply indicate a revival of the territorial sovereignty of the states, or is it a phenomenon with quite different characteristics? To answer this question the paper proceeds by first considering the distinctive features of modern public borders from a historical and theoretical point of view, and then distinguishing different types of border walls on the basis of their functional characteristics. This will help clarify whether border walls are an eccentric phenomenon compared to traditional state borders, and whether the analysis of their features leads us to reframe the traditional concept of state border. (shrink)

This article focuses on the frontier between the technological domain of production of artefacts and the naturalistic domain of the sciences of life and cognition. It shows that, since the 1940s, this frontier has become the place of production of an innovative kind of scientific knowledge??synthetic knowledge.? The article describes the methodology and the main characteristics of synthetic knowledge, and formulates a hypothesis on its epistemological genealogy. Accordingly, it characterizes synthetic knowledge as one of the most advanced expressions of a (...) heterodox tradition of research which, since the 1930s, has been promoting the development of a ?non-representationalist???constructivist??science. (shrink)

Social robotics entertains a particular relationship with anthropomorphism, which it neither sees as a cognitive error, nor as a sign of immaturity. Rather it considers that this common human tendency, which is hypothesized to have evolved because it favored cooperation among early humans, can be used today to facilitate social interactions between humans and a new type of cooperative and interactive agents - social robots. This approach leads social robotics to focus research on the engineering of robots that activate anthropomorphic (...) projections in users. The objective is to give robots "social presence" and "social behaviors" that are sufficiently credible for human users to engage in comfortable and potentially long-lasting relations with these machines. This choice of ’applied anthropomorphism’ as a research methodology exposes the artifacts produced by social robotics to ethical condemnation: social robots are judged to be a "cheating" technology, as they generate in users the illusion of reciprocal social and affective relations. This article takes position in this debate, not only developing a series of arguments relevant to philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences, and robotic AI, but also asking what social robotics can teach us about anthropomorphism. On this basis, we propose a theoretical perspective that characterizes anthropomorphism as a basic mechanism of interaction, and rebuts the ethical reflections that a priori condemns "anthropomorphism-based" social robots. To address the relevant ethical issues, we promote a critical experimentally based ethical approach to social robotics, "synthetic ethics," which aims at allowing humans to use social robots for two main goals: self-knowledge and moral growth. (shrink)

Priority monism is the view that the cosmos is the basic concrete entity on which each of its parts depend. Kovacs has recently argued that none of the classical notions of dependence could be used to spell out priority monism. I argue that four notions of dependence – namely rigid existential dependence, generic existential dependence, explanatory dependence, and generalised explanatory dependence – can indeed be used to spell out priority monism, and specify the conditions under which this is possible.

Il testo vuole incarnare una possibile mediazione tra universi culturali lontani ed essere una lettura propedeutica per chi intenda addentrarsi nella tematica, lasciando che la fede cristiana s’interroghi liberamente sul ‘gender’. Un approccio sereno e critico sia alla cultura laica di genere – della quale si esaminano i nodi principali – sia a quella cattolica, con l’intento di superare le reciproche diffidenze e cercare insieme una verità umanizzante per tutti. L’obiettivo è gettare delle basi condivisibili su cui costruire una sintesi (...) teologica più ampia. Un testo che, nell’esaminare i nodi teoretici, volge lo sguardo alla recente campagna ‘anti-gender’, cercando di fornire le coordinate utili a svelenire il clima e muoversi al suo interno con padronanza di lessico e concettualità. In questo senso, l’opera vuole essere uno strumento per formatori, pastori e attivisti che vogliano introdursi nella complessità senza scorciatoie, per cogliere la ricchezza del ‘pensiero di genere’: nell’orizzonte della promozione di un benessere comunitario e individuale. (shrink)

The Monster Objection has often been considered one of the main reasons to explore non-standard mereological views, such as hylomorphism. Still, it has been rarely discussed and then only in a cursory fashion. This paper fills this gap by offering the first thorough assessment of the objection. It argues that different metaphysical stances, such as presentism and three- and four-dimensionalism, provide different ways of undermining the objection.

Bonaventure is sometimes taken to be an ante litteram champion of the four-dimensional theory of persistence. I argue that this interpretation is incorrect: Bonaventure was no four-dimensionalist.

The paper is about the uses of the argument from legislative counterfactual intention, in the field of legal interpretation and argumentation. After presenting the argument from intention in general, it distinguishes the varities of the argument from counterfactual legislative intention and discusses their justification conditions.

Until recently, an almost perfect parallelism seemed to hold between theories of identity through time and across possible worlds,as every account in the temporal case(endurantism,perdurantism, exdurantism) was mirrored by a twin account in the modal case (trans-world identity, identity-via-parts, identity-via-counterparts). Nevertheless, in the recent literature, this parallelism has been broken because of the implementation in the debate of the relation of location. In particular, endurantism has been subject to a more in-depth analysis, and different versions of it, corresponding to different (...) ways an entity can be located in time, emerged. In this article, we provide a precise map of the conceptions at stake, complete the debate by introducing a version of endurantism not yet considered in the debate — we call transcendentism — and show that it allows us to provide an effective interpretation of the relation of trans-world identity and an intuitive solution in the temporal case. (shrink)

The notion of affordance has been introduced by Gibson (1977, 1979) as the feature of an object or the environment that allows the observer to perform an action, a set of “environmental supports for an organism’s intentional activities” (Reybrouck 2005). Studied under very different perspectives, this concept has become a crucial issue not only for the ecological psychology, but also for cognitive sciences, artificial intelligence studies, and philosophy of mind. This variety of approaches has widened the already ambiguous definition originally (...) provided by Gibson, contributing to the development of different standpoints in open contrast with each other (see Zipoli Caiani 2011). During the last two decades, moreover, many researchers tried to extend the notion also to musical experience, aiming to draw a coherent theory of musical affordances (e.g. Clarke 2005; Nussbaum 2007; Krueger 2011a; 2011b). In this paper, we will argue for a particular concept of musical affordances, that is, as we see it, one narrower and less ambiguous in scope and more closely related to its original. Taking the discovery of canonical neurons as our starting point, we will (i) introduce the general notion of affordance, (ii) discuss some significant contributions in this area of research, mostly focusing on musical affordances and (iii) propose a motor-based interpretation of musical affordances. (shrink)

Riggs v. Palmerhas become famous since Dworkin used it to show that legal positivism is defective. The debate over the merits of Dworkin's claims is still very lively. Yet not enough attention has been paid to the fact that the content of the statute at issue inRiggswas given by thecounterfactual intentionof the legislature. According to arguments from legislative intent, a judicial decision is justified if it is based on the lawmaker's intention. But can legislative intentions be determined counterfactually? More generally, (...) what are the discursive commitments undertaken by a lawyer or a judge, in an exchange of legal reasons, when using this interpretive methodology? This paper addresses these issues considering, in particular, David Lewis's “resemblance” condition and “relevant similarity” between possible worlds in the evaluation of counterfactual statements. The analysis sheds some new light on the debate on theoretical disagreements and shows that Dworkin's conception of law as an argumentative practice is not necessarily at odds with legal positivism. It rather allows us to look at it under a better light. (shrink)

Richard Swinburne is one of the best-known names in the international philosophical scene. His apologetic project is considered one of the largest and most impactful and profound of the last century. The interview conducted here explores many biographical and theoretical issues (Omniscience, Eternity, God’s existence, Free will, Analogy, Relational ontology and Powers ontology, Soul-Body relation, Trinity, Evil) and it aims to trace a broad (albeit necessarily partial) path through his numerous works. The interview took place in 2016, in Oxford, at (...) Swinburne’s home. Today, Swinburne’s thought is discussed in monographs and doctoral theses, witnessing to an influence that will undoubtedly be lasting. (shrink)

From Hegel to Heidegger and Agamben, modern Western philosophy has been haunted by how to think the connections between death, humanness and animality. This article explores how these connections h...

The Anthropocene has been observed as an opportunity to generate new legal imaginaries capable of revising incumbent assumptions of legal and political thought. What opportunities do such ambitions afford for communication between geological and legal thought? Responding to Birrell & Matthews attempt to ‘re-story a lawfor, rather thanof, the Anthropocene,’ I wish to describe some ways in which the Anthropocene Working Group, who are pursuing formalisation of the Anthropocene as an official geological unit, are involved in a similar exercise of (...) re-storying geology. The Anthropocene theme is brought to bear as a geological reality through material practices of measurement and correlation, as well as through the invocation of previous judgements of the evaluative committees associated with the formalisation of new geological unit. This effort amounts to a redefinition of the practices of geological observation, i.e. what counts as geologically relevant and why. In keeping with the theme of an ‘ethics of encounter’, as encouraged by Birrell and Matthews, this article suggests that the AWG’s effort provides a model with which the elaboration of ‘laws for the Anthropocene’ might correspond. (shrink)

L’esame di un passo della Vita di Platone laerziana (III 2) – e di luoghi paralleli riferibili alla medesima tradizione – permette di mettere a fuoco un motivo mitico cruciale nei racconti sulla concorrenza tra essere umano e divinità nel gamos con una mortale: il divieto, che il nume impone al ‘rivale’ di inferiore natura, di congiungersi con la donna che reca in grembo il suo seme, finché l’eroina non abbia portato a termine la gravidanza. Le storie di personaggi femminili (...) colpevoli di duplice gamos – prima con il dio e poi, a breve distanza di tempo, con il mortale – si focalizzano sulle conseguenze nefaste del secondo contaminante connubio: uno per tutti il caso di Coronide madre di Asclepio (e forse il motivo era associato anche ad altre note madri mitiche, come Arianna, Semele e Alcmena). In questi esempi, tuttavia, in genere non è esplicitato il tema della proibizione divina, come invece accade nel bios di Diogene Laerzio. Qui infatti Apollo, dopo aver concepito Platone con Perictione, appare ad Aristone per vietargli il rapporto sessuale con la parthenos. (shrink)

C’è bisogno di una nuova sintesi. Inter- e intradisciplinare, con una visione d’insieme coerente, scientifica, senza pregiudizi, al servizio di una Chiesa che – con papa Francesco – è alla ricerca di nuove analisi e di proposte pratiche innovative. Necessaria è la prospettiva della piena integralità umana delle persone omosessuali, che interroghi il loro amore in tutta la sua complessità. La psicoanalisi, per prima, può contribuire a elaborare una visione dell’affettività omosessuale complessiva, integrale e positiva. La teologia può ascoltarne le (...) conclusioni, senza rinunciare alle sue categorie etiche, ma aggiornando la propria posizione, proponendo una visione pienamente cattolica della persona e della sua sessualità. Visione che si traduce in indicazioni pastorali in grado di aiutare una persona omosessuale a vivere in serena pienezza la propria situazione, la propria affettività e spiritualità cristiana. (shrink)

I develop a definition of mereological endurantism which overcomes objections that have been proposed in the literature and thereby avoids the charge of obscurity put forward by Sider against the view.

There is a lively debate in contemporary Analytic Philosophy of Religion about the consistency of the Trinitarian doctrine. In this context, the notion of ‘mystery’ has become crucial. However, although it is currently considered the main challenge of Trinitarian theology, its definition remains rather partial and superficial. After a brief description of today’s Mysterianism, I analyse three ‘emblematic’ positions in light of the current debate: Aquinas, Leibniz and Hegel present three ways to believe in a mysterious Trinity. I will point (...) out a few possible weaknesses in the positions of the first two authors in order to better highlight the usefulness of the Hegelian position, often underestimated in the contemporary analytic debate. I will also analyse the connection between the three positions and their respective metaphysics, showing the epistemological premises (e.g., analogy and univocity) that need to be better investigated in the future. (shrink)

In the recent debate on Christian theism, the position called Open Theism (OT) tries to solve the dilemma of omniscience and human freedom. In OT, the key word of the human-divine relationship is “risk”: in his relationship with us, God is a risk-taker in that he adapts his plan to human decisions and to the situations that arise from them. “Risk” is the fundamental characteristic of any true love relationship. According to OT, God has no exhaustive knowledge of how humans (...) will use their will, and the divine plan for this world is not seen as fixed for eternity. OT distinguishes between meticulous providence and general providence and denies that the former can exist. After illustrating these positions and a particular view of OT called essential kenosis, I highlight some of their weaknesses and conclude by asking whether the concept of mystery (at least in some of its possible interpretations: I outline four “solutions”) can enable a reconciliation between classical theism and OT. By applying an approach to the notion of mystery usually connected to the Trinity, I show that the dilemma of omniscience, human freedom and providence does not compromise the plausibility of theism. (shrink)